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We study the problem of identifying the source of emerging large-scale outbreaks of foodborne
disease. To solve the source identification problem we formulate a probabilistic model of the con-
tamination diffusion process as a random walk on a network and derive the maximum likelihood
estimator for the source location. By modeling the transmission process as a random walk, we are
able to develop a novel, computationally tractable solution that accounts for all possible paths of
travel through the network. This is in contrast to existing approaches to network source identifica-
tion, which assume that the contamination travels along either the shortest or highest probability
paths. We demonstrate the benefits of the multiple-paths approach through application to different
network topologies, including stylized models of food supply network structure and real data from
the 2011 EHEC outbreak in Germany. We show significant improvements in accuracy and reliability
compared with the relevant state-of-the-art approach to source identification. Beyond foodborne
disease, these methods should find application in identifying the source of spread in network-based
diffusion processes more generally, including in networks not well approximated by tree-like struc-
ture.
Keywords: Complex systems, Source identification, Epidemic, Spreading, Diffusion, Network Diffusion, Food
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I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity and globalization of food production
have made foodborne disease a widespread public health
problem in both developed and developing countries.
Most outbreaks of foodborne disease involve a source of
contamination at the point of preparation or sale and
affect a small group of people in a localized area. How-
ever a small but worrisome minority of outbreaks are
generated by a contamination originating at the site of
production or processing, generating a widespread dif-
fusion of contamination through the supply chain and
affecting a potentially much greater number of people
across geographically distributed locations. When large-
scale outbreaks do occur the impact on the public’s
health may be massive. In the summer of 2011 an out-
break caused by Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli
(EHEC) O104:H4, spread by sprouts grown in Germany,
caused 54 deaths and 4,321 illnesses in 16 countries over
a nine-week period [1, 2]. As the food system continues
to become interconnected, driven by large-scale produc-
tion practices and distribution over ever-larger distances,
both the prevalence and the severity of consequences of
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large-scale outbreaks are increasing. From 2005 - 2014,
nearly 200 multi-state outbreaks were identified and in-
vestigated in the US as compared with 85 over the years
1995 - 2004; these multi-state outbreaks accounted for
3% of total outbreaks, but were responsible for 34% of
hospitalizations and 56% of deaths [3].
In the event of a large-scale outbreak, rapidly identi-
fying the contamination source is essential to minimizing
impact on public health and industry. There are three
standard components to the regulatory response and in-
vestigation process, each contributing to the challenge of
identifying the source: (i) detecting that an outbreak is
occurring, (ii) identifying the food vector causing the out-
break, and (iii) identifying the location source of the out-
break at a farm or processing center. Novel strategies fa-
cilitated by new analytical tools and the increasing avail-
ability of data sources are being developed to improve to
the ability to (i) detect outbreaks, e.g. by crowdsourcing
self-reported foodborne illness concerns from popular so-
cial networking sites [4–6] and (ii) implicate the food type
or even specific product carrying the disease, e.g. by ana-
lyzing retail-scanner data from grocery stores [7, 8]. This
paper addresses part (iii) of the outbreak investigation,
identifying the location of origin.
Tracing the location of the source of an outbreak
is a challenging problem due to the complexity, dy-
namics, and massive scale of the food supply network
and the absence of integrated labeling and distribution
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2records. However, current investigation methods repre-
sent a missed opportunity to utilize valuable information
to solve the source localization problem. The regulatory
approach generally involves triangulation, or tracing back
the unique distribution paths of products from several lo-
cations to determine if there is a point of convergence in
the supply network, such as a common date and location
of harvest or place of manufacture [9–11]. Because of
resource limitations, investigators are only able to make
use of a small subset of the reported cases of illness –
data that serves as evidence in the source location prob-
lem. With only a few pieces of evidence, the time con-
suming traceback will often be unsuccessful in narrowing
down the problem significantly. As a result, investiga-
tions are completed in many cases after the outbreak has
ended and the contamination has made its way through
the supply network, meaning that no cases of illness are
averted.
Furthermore, the majority of outbreaks remain un-
solved, meaning that the food and/or location source of
the outbreak is never identified [11, 12]. In the 13,352
foodborne disease outbreaks (causing 271,974 illnesses)
documented by the US Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) during 1998-2008, only 4,887 (37%)
were traced back to a single food vehicle and pathogenic
source, with less than 15% of these to a specific contam-
ination point [13].
A. A network approach to source identification
Food distribution is a complex system that can be seen
as a network of trade flows connecting supply network
actors. Identifying the source of an outbreak of contami-
nation distributed across a network can best be solved by
considering this network structure and the dimensions of
information it contains. Together with reports of illness,
this network information can be used to better solve the
problem of identifying the source of large-scale outbreaks.
The literature on the network source identification
problem has grown widely in recent years covering prob-
lems in many different contexts, from contagious dis-
ease infecting a human population, to computer viruses
spreading through the Internet, to rumors or trends dif-
fusing through a social network. Much of this work has
focused on studying this problem in analytically tractable
frameworks, designing approaches to work on trees and
extending to general network structures in an ad hoc
manner [14, 20–27]. These simplified frameworks lack
many features of real-world networks and problem con-
texts that can dramatically impact transmission dynam-
ics, and therefore, backwards inference of the transmis-
sion process. Moreover, the features that distinguish
foodborne disease in the context of source identification
have not previously been studied or identified. We review
these features in Section II and conclude that much of the
existing work cannot be implemented in the foodborne
disease problem because it makes assumptions about the
transmission process that are unrealistic in the context of
food supply networks – that is, identifying the source of
an epidemic contagion whereas foodborne contamination
spreads through a transport-mediated diffusion process
[18, 19, 22–25], or because it requires data that is not
available – complete observations of the contamination
status of all nodes in the network [14–16] or timed net-
work data [18–23].
B. Problem statement and contributions
To solve the source detection problem in the context of
foodborne disease, we assume as given a network model
of the supply of a specific food commodity and a prob-
abilistic model of the transmission process of contami-
nation spreading through this network. At some point
in time a single contamination source begins to send out
contaminated products, which travel through the net-
work according to the transmission model, resulting in
in observations of illness at a set of network nodes. Our
objective is to minimize the error between our estimate
of the location of the source and the true location of the
source in the network, given the locations of the obser-
vations of illness.
We formulate the transmission process of contami-
nated food items traveling through the supply network
as a discrete Markov chain, i.e. a random walk on the
network where transmission probabilities correspond to
the edge weights. This is a natural transmission model
for non-contagious diffusion on a weighted, directed net-
work. To estimate the true source location we adopt a
maximum likelihood (ML) approach, by definition mini-
mizing the estimation error. The ML estimator chooses
the highest probability source node according to the like-
lihood of observing the reports of illness.
By formulating the transmission process as a weighted
random walk, we are able to develop a computation-
ally tractable representation of the ML estimator that
accounts for all possible paths of all possible lengths
traveled by each contaminated food item. This is in
contrast to existing approaches to source detection in
weighted, time-homogeneous networks, which develop
heuristic methods that consider only the shortest path
[24, 25], or the dominant (i.e. highest-probability and
shortest) path [26, 27] between each source and each ob-
servation. While such approximations may be justified
in other network contexts, considering only one possible
path of travel between each source and each observation
can dramatically limit the ability to model the trans-
mission dynamics of foodborne disease outbreaks, and
therefore reduce the accuracy of source detection.
Practically, we demonstrate that a source estimator
that accounts for all possible transmission paths can lo-
cate the outbreak source with greater timeliness, accu-
racy, and reliability than other methods, and more ro-
bustly across extreme cases of network structures. This
is shown through the application to different network
3topologies, including stylized models of food supply net-
work structure and simulated outbreaks, and real net-
work and illness data from the 2011 EHEC contaminated
sprout outbreak in Germany. Compared with the rele-
vant state-of-the-art approach [26, 27], the improvement
in accuracy with our source estimator is always observ-
able and can be substantial, ranging from a 10% to 80%
improvement depending on the network topology evalu-
ated. Furthermore, application to the EHEC outbreak
demonstrates that our approach is not only more accu-
rate but also more reliable, consistently identifying the
source location region over the time course of the out-
break.
Methodologically, though our paper is motivated by
the case of foodborne disease, the ML source estimator
developed here can be extended to identify the source of
network-based diffusion spreading processes more gener-
ally. Because these methods are not limited to tree-like
network approximations, they should find application in
a greater range of problem contexts and demonstrate sim-
ilar benefits in accuracy and reliability of source localiza-
tion as those shown for foodborne disease.
C. Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we review the existing literature on the
network-based source detection, first outlining key fea-
tures that distinguish this problem from source detec-
tion in other network contexts then using these features
to categorize the existing approaches according to their
relevance to the foodborne disease source detection prob-
lem. In Section III we introduce the probabilistic food-
borne disease transmission model and derive the source
estimator. In Section IV we demonstrate the effectiveness
of our source estimation framework through application
to both stylized networks and real data from 2011 EHEC
outbreak. In Section V we conclude and discuss future
work.
II. PROBLEM FRAMING AND
RELATED WORK
To formulate the problem of source detection on a net-
work, assumptions must be made regarding (i) the net-
work and observation data available for source identifi-
cation, and (ii) the transmission process that led to the
observations. Based on basic practical knowledge of food
supply networks and the foodborne disease contamina-
tion process, we introduce the source identification prob-
lem in the context of foodborne disease outbreaks and
outline six features that distinguish this problem from
source detection in other network contexts due either
to practical data limitations or differences in transmis-
sion process mechanics. We then use the six features to
categorize the existing literature on the network-based
source detection problem according to relevance to the
foodborne disease context.
A. Background and Definitions
Food supply systems can be represented by a directed
network structure consisting of multiple stages of pro-
duction, distribution, storage, and consumption. Flows
through the network are generally structured such that
product is distributed in a forward direction along a
path, or a collection of directed edges connecting sup-
ply nodes from origination to point of sale. A large-scale
outbreak occurs when contaminated food departs from
some source in an early stage of the network that is able
to reach downstream nodes in geographically distributed
locations. The contamination will eventually make its
way to consumers, who develop illness some time after
consuming the contaminated food. Case reports of illness
are associated with the supply network node at which
the offending product was purchased and exits the sup-
ply network, e.g. a retailer or restaurant; these nodes
can be considered infected.
The network in Fig. 1 represents a supply network
in which contamination at a food producer has spread
through the supply network, leading to reports of illness
at 3 different retailers. With this structure mapped, it is
straightforward to utilize all case data (i.e. evidence)
available during an event to identify the set of feasi-
ble sources of contamination, that is, the set of nodes
that connect to all known contaminated nodes. Network
structural information thus provides a first cut into the
source identification problem by enabling the identifica-
tion of feasible sources. To differentiate between the fea-
sible sources, further dimensions of information available
within the network can be leveraged. Each edge contains
information about the volume of goods traded between
supply network actors. Volume-weighted information is
a source of heterogeneity that can be thought of as the
relative propagation potential of a given edge, providing
insight into the paths along which contaminated product
is likely to have traveled.
Producers
Processors
Distributors
Retailers
FIG. 1: Illustration of a food distribution network with
three reported cases of illness (at the shaded nodes)
linked to retailer nodes.
4B. Distinguishing features of
foodborne disease transmission
1. A transport, not epidemiological, transmission process
Many network-based source detection methods are de-
signed to identify the source of an infectious contagion.
These methods often assume some variant of the epi-
demiological model of contagion transmission, including
the widely used susceptible-infected (SI) or susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) models. However the transmis-
sion of contamination through the food supply to people
is different from the disease contagion process from peo-
ple to people. As contaminated (solid, perishable) food
moves through the supply network, the pathogenic quan-
tity will generally remain conserved, meaning it will nei-
ther spread to other food items nor decay significantly
in infectivity [28, 29]. The former is due to a number of
factors including the lack of contact between packaged
items, the lack of interaction or mixing between unpack-
aged items, and the biological insusceptibility of contam-
ination to spread. The latter is due to the shelf life of
perishable items being shorter than the pathogenic de-
cay rate. The contamination process in the context of
foodborne disease therefore largely involves the contam-
inated food diffusing rather than contagiously spreading
through the supply network. Transmission models based
on the epidemiological process of contagion and recov-
ery will add complexity without representing additional
dynamics of the diffusion process.
Additionally, the observation data available for source
identification occurs on the human level and only via in-
fection status, (I) in the SI/R model. Observations of
contamination occur when people report illness. Each ill-
ness is linked to a supply network node at which the con-
taminated food was purchased. Data regarding the con-
tamination status of individual food items is not normally
available during an investigation. Furthermore, it is not
possible to establish from the illness reports whether a
supply node has ever received contaminated food and is
thus susceptible (S), as it may have led to illnesses that
went unreported. Methods that rely on observations of
susceptible status or that assume nodes not reporting in-
fection are contamination-free (also called “negative in-
formation”) are thus non-applicable in this setting.
2. Observations are sparse
Though the contamination will travel through multiple
network nodes on its journey through the supply network,
it is only observed when illness is reported in connection
with the exiting or absorbing node at which contami-
nated food was purchased. The contamination status
of transient nodes involved in the production, process-
ing, or storage of food, though closer to the source in
number of network edges, will remain hidden to investi-
gators unless further investigations are performed (nor-
mally during later stages of an investigation). A trivial
implication of the sparsity of observations is that it is un-
realistic to assume, as some source detection methods do,
that the contamination status of all nodes in the network
is known.
3. Observations will always be spaced far from the source
The placement of observations only at absorbing nodes
also means that there will be a large network distance
between the source and each observation, increasing the
number of possible paths that could have been traveled
and in turn the uncertainty in the structure of the diffu-
sion trajectory. At the same time, the differing volume-
weights along the edges of the supply network provide
valuable information for inference. Given the large un-
certainty in the diffusion structure, approaches to source
detection that consider network structure alone will be
inferior to those that consider this weighted information.
4. Similar path lengths
Due to the staged structure of the food supply net-
work, paths through the network from source to observa-
tion will be close to the same length in terms of number
of network edges. Many existing source detection meth-
ods simplify the inference process by assuming that the
contamination traveled across the shortest path from the
source to each observation, or otherwise by leveraging
shortest path properties of graphs. These approxima-
tions will apply poorly in the food supply network con-
text where most paths will be indistinguishable in length.
5. Multiple candidate paths
Between any possible source and observation in a food
supply network, there exist multiple paths of travel of
similar weight or likelihood. This is due to the lack of mo-
nopolies in food production, trade, and retailing markets:
any given food type will be distributed through multiple
larger retailers or wholesalers, each dealing with similarly
large volumes of product. Certain source detection meth-
ods make the simplifying assumption that the contami-
nation travels across the single highest-probability path
between a source and observation. These methods will
be inaccurate in the food supply network setting where
transmission dynamics are not necessarily dominated by
a small percentage of connections.
6. Data on times through the network are lacking
In theory, there should be a signal for source detection
from the timed reports of illnesses combined with a model
of the time it takes to transmit the contamination. Each
5collection of edges in a network path encodes information
about the time delay that a contaminated product could
have taken to travel these steps. These delays will be
distributed differently according to parameters like the
distance and speed of travel and supply network logis-
tics encountered. However, there is significant temporal
uncertainty in the contamination transmission process.
The time the contamination may spend in storage, both
at various nodes along the supply network (e.g. ware-
houses) and with the consumer after purchase, as well
as during the incubation period, can be significant and
vary widely – and potentially much more so than the time
spent in travel. Furthermore, while the times of infection
are available to some degree of accuracy (recorded ac-
cording to patient recalled time of illness onset), data on
storage times through the network are unavailable with
the exception of a few case-specific customer or retailer
survey studies [29, 30]. Therefore, while time can be
an important aspect in some foodborne disease source
detection applications, time-based methods are not cur-
rently implementable in the foodborne disease context
given available data.
C. Categorization of literature
Many approaches to the network source detection
problem have been developed in recent years, though
none of these methods have specifically considered the
context of outbreaks of foodborne disease. We now
briefly review the major themes in the existing work,
using the features described above to guide the discus-
sion in terms of relevance to the problem on food supply
networks. These features are summarized in Table I.
The earliest approaches to source detection are based
on complete observations, relying on knowing the con-
tamination status (SI/R) of each node in the network a
fixed point in time [14–16]. These methods do not incor-
porate information about differing weights along edges
but are based solely on graph structure by employing
notions of network centrality, the intuition being that
the node most “central” to the observed contamination
process is the source. The seminal work by Shah and
Zaman [14] introduces the measure of rumor centrality,
which considers the number of linear extensions between
each source and the infected nodes. The method and an-
alytical results concerning detection probability are de-
rived for trees or tree-like graphs; to apply to general
networks, a Breadth-First-Search (BFS) heuristic that
assumes the contamination traveled across the shortest
paths to the observations must be used. Other methods
based on betweenness centrality [15] and eigenvector cen-
trality [16, 17] apply to general networks without employ-
ing a shortest path heuristic, although the calculation of
betweenness is based on shortest path properties. These
methods were important for establishing foundational re-
sults on the network source detection problem, but are
impractical due to the complete observation assumption.
Many methods have since been developed for the more
realistic setting that only a subset of the contaminated
nodes are observable, i.e. partial observations. These
can be categorized into temporal methods – approaches
designed to make use of the information from the timed
reports of illness and times through the network, and
non-temporal methods – approaches that rely only on
the node location where contamination has been re-
ported. The temporal category includes methods as-
suming discrete-time epidemic (SI/R) contagion models
based on dynamic message-passing [18] and Bayesian be-
lief propagation [19] equations, or continuous-time Gaus-
sian transmission models [20, 21]. While a continuous-
time transmission model is a better approximation for re-
alistic settings, this approach in [20, 21] is limited by be-
ing designed for trees and extended to general graphs via
a BFS (shortest-path) heuristic. Other temporal meth-
ods have been proposed that observe the contamination
status of a subset of sensor nodes at user-controlled in-
tervals [22, 23]. These methods are impractical for the
foodborne disease context given the lack of temporal
data available for solving the problem. Furthermore, the
methods based on contagion models [18, 19, 22–25] are
inapplicable in the case of the transport-mediated diffu-
sion process of foodborne disease spread.
Fewer approaches to source detection exist within the
category of non-temporal approaches based on partial ob-
servations. A line of work based on the notion of Jordan
centrality has led to multiple variants of a technique that
chooses the source node with the shortest maximum path
length over all observations, that is, the Jordan center
[24, 25]. While this method has been extended to in-
corporate weights along the edges[40] [25], it relies on
path lengths to discriminate between sources. Further-
more, the technique is designed for tree-like networks;
for application to general topologies a separate proce-
dure based on closeness centrality (i.e., counting the sum
of the shortest path to each observation) is proposed.
Another line of work in the category of non-temporal
approaches involves a measure of Effective Distance on a
network, defined such that the shortest, highest probabil-
ity path from a source to an observation has the shortest
Effective Distance through the network [26, 27]. To iden-
tify the source of an outbreak, the single shortest Effec-
tive Distance path to each observation is identified. The
source is then chosen as the node that minimizes the av-
erage and variance of the shortest Effective Distance to
each observation.
The Effective Distance method is the existing source
detection approach most relevant to the foodborne dis-
ease setting and has been evaluated in application to
the 2011 outbreak of EHEC in sprouts [27], also consid-
ered as an application case in Section IV. Nonetheless,
it is a heuristic approach that considers only a single
path to each observation. It was designed for applica-
tion to global mobility networks which are characterized
by great heterogeneity in path lengths and probabilities,
and for which contamination processes will be dominated
6by a small percentage of the shortest, highest probability
transport connections. It performs well in those settings,
i.e. outbreaks of infectious disease (e.g. SARS, H1N1)
mediated through global air travel networks [26]. In food
supply networks where path probabilities are less differ-
entiated the Effective Distance method will consider only
the single, highest probability path, ignoring the contri-
bution of plausible paths of marginally lower probabil-
ity. The unsuitability of this heuristic in the food supply
network context is observable when applied to the 2011
EHEC outbreak, where source identification results are
unstable and less accurate than the infectious disease case
examples [26, 27].
D. Summary
Many existing approaches to the source detection prob-
lem cannot be implemented in the foodborne disease
context because they are designed for a different pur-
pose – identifying the source of an epidemic contagion
[18, 19, 22–25] whereas foodborne disease is spread ac-
cording to a diffusion process, or because they require
data that is not realistically available – complete observa-
tions of the contamination status of all nodes in the net-
work [14–16] or timed network data [18–23]. Those that
are implementable are limited by unrealistic assumptions
regarding the transmission process. These methods ap-
ply tree-like approximations to deal with general graphs,
assuming contamination always travels from source to ob-
servations along the shortest [24, 25] or highest probabil-
ity [26, 27] paths. While this type of approximation is jus-
tified in certain network contexts, food supply networks
are not well approximated by tree structure. Moreover,
these methods are by definition approximations that do
not explore the full set of trajectories between each source
and observation. The random walk transmission model
developed in this work aims to address this limitation,
presenting a computationally tractable approach to cal-
culate the total probability of traveling between a source
and each observation along all possible paths of all pos-
sible lengths. The resulting approach is not only rele-
vant for solving the source identification problem in food
supply networks but also represents a methodological im-
provement for source identification in diffusion processes
more generally.
III. SOURCE DETECTION MODEL
A. Problem Statement
Our goal is to identify the source of a foodborne disease
outbreak based on the reports of illness and information
about the underlying network structure. We assume as
given a network model and a probabilistic model of the
transmission process of contamination spreading through
this network. At some point in time a single contamina-
tion source s∗ begins to send out contaminated prod-
ucts, which spread through the network according to the
transmission model, resulting in a list of observations of
illness Θ associated with a set of network nodes O. Our
objective is to minimize the error of our estimate of the
source location in the network and the location of the
true source, given the information from the observations
of illness. To estimate the true source location we adopt
a maximum likelihood (ML) approach that chooses the
highest probability source node according to the likeli-
hood of observing the reports of illness, by definition
minimizing the estimation error.
In the following we describe our model of the food sup-
ply network and the foodborne disease transmission pro-
cess. We then define the ML source estimator for food
distribution networks.
B. Food supply network model
We model the food supply network as a directed graph
G = {V, E}, where V is the set of nodes representing
supply network actors. G consists of two types of nodes:
the set of absorbing nodes VR and the set of transient
nodes VQ, such that V = {VQ, VR}. Absorbing nodes
represent the point at which product is purchased for
consumption and departs the supply network, never to
reenter (e.g. retailers or restaurants). All other nodes
are transient, representing the points at which food is
generated or produced, processed, and stored. E is the
set of edges of the form (i, j) ∈ VQ×VQ∪VQ×VR, repre-
senting trade relationships. Each edge (i, j) is weighted
by the volume of food shipped over a certain time period
from i to j, wij .
C. Foodborne disease transmission model
The process leading to foodborne disease illness pre-
sentation consists the initial inoculation of contaminated
product somewhere in production and subsequent dis-
persal through the food supply network, followed by the
transmission of contamination from product to person,
ending in illness.
At the core of our model of this process are the follow-
ing assumptions:
i. The contaminated quantity is fixed, and is com-
posed of individual contaminated units that nei-
ther spread nor recover from contamination as they
travel through the supply network.
ii. Each contaminated unit travels independently
through the supply network.
iii. Each transition of a unit from one node to the next
entails an independent transmission direction.
7TABLE I: Categorization of existing work on the source detection problem according to relevance to the foodborne
disease context.
Limitations of source identification methodologies in foodborne disease context
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Source identification
methodology of
existing work Assumes SI(R)
model/status
Assumes complete
observations
Ignores weights Only shortest
paths
Only dominant
paths
Assumes
observation times
Rumor centrality
[14]
X X X
Betweenness centrality [15] X X X
Eigenvector centrality [16, 17] X X
Message passing [18] X X
Belief propagation [19] X X
Gaussian
[20, 21]
X X
Four-metric
[22]
X X X
Monte Carlo
[23]
X X X
Jordan centrality
[24, 25]
X X
Effective Distance [26, 27] X
Taken together, these assumptions describe a unit-
centric diffusion process that can be visualized as a large
number of “pinballs” traveling through a pinball ma-
chine, each ball’s trajectory determined according to a
stochastic process described below.
Given these assumptions, we introduce the diffusion
model. First, some initial quantity of product produced
at a single unknown source s∗ is contaminated. We
model s∗ as a random variable with a predefined prior
probability distribution, P (s∗ = s) over s ∈ VQ . The
contamination diffusion process is initiated when batches
or units of contaminated product depart from s∗.
Due to the second assumption, a discrete-time Markov
process determines the movement of a contaminated unit,
i.e. a weighted random walk through the supply net-
work. The sequence of states Xn obtained in successive
transitions are determined by the state-to-state Markov
transition probabilities,
P (Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) = pij .
The pij taken together compose P , the row-stochastic
Markov transition matrix for the transmission process of
a contaminated unit occurring on network G. The proba-
bility of self-transition is defined as pii = 1 for absorbing
nodes i ∈ VR . Because of the supply network structure,
it is convenient to consider P in an aggregated, ordered
form such that the absorbing nodes come last. We can
then unite the transient nodes and the absorbing nodes
so that the form of the transition matrix becomes
P =
[
PQ PR
0 IR
]
,
where PQ is the |VQ| × |VQ| sub-matrix concerning tran-
sitions between transient nodes, PR is the |VQ| × |VR|
sub- matrix concerning transitions from transient nodes
into absorbing nodes, 0 is a matrix of zeroes and IR is
the |VR| × |VR| sub-matrix representing absorption at a
consumer node.
Starting from s∗ , the diffusion of a contaminated unit
through the supply network is fully determined by the
Markov transmission matrix P . The process ends when
an absorbing node o ∈ VR is reached, generating a list
of directed edges connecting s∗ and o, the network path
γs∗o. After departing the supply network at o, the con-
taminated unit is consumed. A set of K individuals con-
suming contaminated units will report or observe illness.
We label the node linked to observation k by ok , result-
ing in a list of K observations Θ = (o1, . . . , oK). These
observations will be linked to the network at the unique
set of nodes o ∈ Θ ⊆ VR , such that |Θ| ≤ K . An im-
portant implication of the “pinball” assumption is that
the transmission paths γsok through the supply network,
and thus the observations ok , are mutually independent.
The final step in developing the transmission model in-
volves connecting the stochastic process with the physi-
cal quantities defined in the network model. The volumes
shipped from i to j can be seen as a proxy for the condi-
tional probability that a contaminated item is sent along
that direction. We therefore define the transition prob-
abilities pij as the proportion of volume-flux sent from i
to j,
pij =
wij∑
j
wij
∈ [0, 1].
D. Source Estimator: Bayesian Inference
Our goal is to find the most “probable” source s∗ ∈
VQ based on the list of observations Θ. We introduce a
8Bayesian formulation for the probability that a feasible
source node s is the true source s∗, given the observations
and the prior distribution over s∗:
P (s∗ = s|Θ) = P (s
∗ = s)P (Θ|s∗ = s)
P (Θ)
(1)
To identify the source, we adopt a maximum prob-
ability of detection approach, designing an estimator sˆ
that selects the feasible source node s that maximizes
the probability P (s∗ = s|Θ), i.e.
sˆ = arg max
s∈Ω
P (s∗ = s)P (Θ|s∗ = s) (2)
where s ∈ Ω is the set of feasible source nodes. Here
we have observed that only a subset of nodes Ω ⊆ VQ
will be feasible source candidates: the set of nodes in
VQ that share at least one path through the network to
all contaminated nodes ok ∈ Ω. Unless any prior in-
formation regarding the source location is available[41]
we assume the prior distribution over s∗ is uniform, i.e.
P (s∗ = s) = 1/|Ω| for all nodes s ∈ Ω , making the
estimator sˆ the maximum likelihood estimator.
The main challenge in solving (2) is estimating the
likelihood P (Θ|s∗ = s). The probability of observing
illnesses at the locations in Θ from a contamination orig-
inated at s will depend on the paths taken through G
from s to all observations ok ∈ Θ . However, there are
multiple possible paths γsok from s to each observation
node ok ∈ Θ. The exact probability that s is the source is
equal to the total probability over every permutation of
paths for which s is the source. We now introduce a few
definitions that allow us to write the source likelihood
defined over all permutations:
• Γsok = The set of all paths γ{n}sok through G from s
to o,
{
γ
{1}
sok , . . . , γ
{N}
sok
}
• pis = An s-cascade, or a specific permutation of
the K paths connecting feasible source s to each
observation location ok ∈ Θ . Formally, pis is an
element of the Cartesian product over the sets of
paths {Γsok}ok∈Θ, i.e.,
(γso1 , . . . , γsoK ) ∈ Γso1 × · · · × ΓsoK
• Πs = The set of all s-cascades, or all permutations
of paths from s to each ok ∈ Θ , i.e.,
Πs = Γsok × · · · × Γsok = {(γso1 , . . . , γsoK ) : γsok ∈ Γsok}
(3)
With these definitions, the source likelihood can be
written as the total probability of all permutations of
paths where s is the source of the cascade,
P (Θ|s∗ = s) =
∑
pis∈Πs
P (pis|s)P (Θ|s, pis) =
∑
pis∈Πs
P (pis|s),
(4)
where the term P (Θ|s, pis) is equal to 1, since by defini-
tion, the observation locations ok ∈ Θ are the endpoints
of the paths γsok ∈ pis.
Solving equation (4) amounts to finding the total prob-
ability over all s-cascades pis ∈ Πs . The probability of an
individual s-cascade P (pis|s) can be expanded in terms
of the constituent paths γsok ∈ pis and transition proba-
bilities pij between each adjacent node pairs (i, j) ∈ γsok
as
P (pis|s) = P (γso1 , . . . , γsoK |s)
=
∏
γsok∈pis
P (γsok |s) (5)
=
∏
γsok∈pis
∏
(i,j)∈γsok
pij
where the second equality follows from the indepen-
dence of paths to each observation ok and the third equal-
ity follows from the total probability associated with path
γsok . The likelihood can then be found in terms of the
transition probabilities as
P (Θ|s∗ = s) =
∑
pis∈Πs
∏
γsok∈pis
∏
(i,j)∈γsok
pij . (6)
An illustration evaluating equation (6) on a small
network and outbreak is provided in Section III E.
Evaluating the likelihood by solving equation (6) ex-
plicitly requires enumerating all paths γsok contained in
each s-cascade pis , over all cascades Πs , which be-
comes combinatorially difficult for large networks given
even very few illness observations. Existing methods have
dealt with this complexity by assuming the contamina-
tion travels along a single s-cascade: the set of short-
est paths [24, 25] or shortest, highest probability paths
[26, 27]. In the following we introduce an alternate rep-
resentation of the likelihood P (Θ|s∗ = s) that allows us
to develop a simple algebraic expression that is prob-
abilistically equivalent to equation (6), from which we
can tractably compute the total probability over all s-
cascades.
We begin by showing that equation (4) can be rear-
ranged from an expression that enumerates over each s-
cascade pis ∈ Πs to one that enumerates over each obser-
vation ok ∈ Θ. Starting from the right-hand side of (4)
we have,∑
pis∈Πs
P (pis|s) = P (Πs|s) = P (Γso1 × · · · × ΓsoK |s),
by total probability and the definition of Πs . Then,
P (Γso1×· · ·×ΓsoK |s) = P
( ∏
ok∈Θ
Γsok |s
)
=
∏
ok∈Θ
P (Γsok |s) .
9where the last equality follows from the independence
of observations ok ∈ Θ. Therefore,
∑
pis∈Πs
P (pis|s) =
∏
ok∈Θ
P (Γsok |s) . (7)
The term P (Γsok |s) represents the total probability of
reaching location ok from starting point s along all pos-
sible paths γ
{n}
sok ∈ Γsok . Let us denote this probability as
P (Γsok |s) = asok , so that we are interested in evaluating
P (Θ|s∗ = s) =
∏
ok∈Θ
asok . (8)
To compute asok we could sum over the probability of
all individual paths
{
γ
{1}
sok , . . . , γ
{N}
sok
}
∈ Γsok , but this
again requires enumerating all possible paths between s
and ok, which is as combinatorially difficult as evaluating
(6).
An alternative representation involves recognizing asok
as the absorbing probability for a Markov chain, or the
probability that a contaminated item starting at s gets
“captured” at ok . The absorbing probability can be
written as [31]:
asok =
∞∑
n=0
∑
l∈VQ
p
(n)
sl plok , (9)
where p
(n)
sl denotes the probability of transitioning
from transient node s to transient node l ∈ VQ in exactly
n steps, and plok denotes the probability of transitioning
from l to absorbing node ok (in one step). Equation (9)
represents the probability of starting at s and being ab-
sorbed at ok in one or more steps – that is, over paths
of any length[42]. The probability of being absorbed in
a single step is equal to psok . If this does not happen,
the contamination may move either to another absorbing
state (in which case it never reaches ok ), or to transient
state l. In fact, it may move among the transient states
for any number of transitions before landing at l, which
occurs after n steps with probability p
(n)
sl . From l it then
has probability plok of going to ok.
The probability p
(n)
sl that the contamination travels
from s to l in exactly n steps is found as the (s, l)th
element of sl the transition-state matrix PQ raised to
the nth power. Therefore, we can write equation (9) in
matrix form as [31],
A =
∞∑
n=0
PnQPR, (10)
where we have also recognized plok as the (l, o)
th ele-
ment of the absorbing-state matrix PR. Here we distin-
guish o and ok, since o describes the unique node in VR
corresponding to the observation ok and therefore (l, o)
points to a specific entry in PR. Summing the geometric
series, equation (10) can be expressed in closed-form as,
A = (I − PQ)−1PR, (11)
which is well-defined because for any absorbing Markov
chain, I − PQ will have an inverse [31].
Combining equations (8) and (11) we can fully define
the likelihood over all observations,
P (Θ|s∗ = s) =
∏
ok∈Θ
[
(I − PQ)−1PR
]
sok
. (12)
Evaluating this equation requires only a single opera-
tion to compute the matrix A.
We can now see the full advantage of the relation de-
rived in equation (7): whereas the left-hand term requires
enumerating all possible paths γsok between s and each
observation ok, by rearranging to order over the obser-
vations, the right-hand term can be evaluated through a
single algebraic computation.
Equation (12) can be used in the maximum likelihood
source estimator in equation (2) to select the source node
that maximizes the posterior probability P (Θ|s∗ = s)
over all possible sources s ∈ Ω,
sˆ = arg max
s∈Ω
∏
ok∈Θ
[
(I − PQ)−1PR
]
sok
. (13)
We can also construct a posterior probability for each
feasible source s ∈ Ω,
P (s∗ = s|Θ) = 1
c
P (s∗ = s)P (Θ|s∗ = s), (14)
for some normalizing constant c, forming a probability
distribution over the set s ∈ Ω, which can be used to
identify a set of the most probable sources.
It is important to note that by the formulation in equa-
tion (9), asok represents the total probability of reaching
location ok from starting point s, considering all possi-
ble paths of all possible lengths. Given the transmission
model of Section III C, which assumes observations are
independent, the likelihood in (12) thus represents the
exact total probability of all observations resulting from
s.
This source detection approach relies on the inde-
pendent observation assumption. The implication of
this assumption is that contamination trajectories or s-
cascades containing paths with shared edges are not as-
signed higher probabilistic weighting during inference of
the source. This assumption may introduce some er-
ror in situations where contaminated items have traveled
in the same batch through early legs of their journey
through the supply network, for example being shipped
together from producer to distributor before being di-
vided into separate pallets. Nonetheless, the condition of
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independence between observations can reasonably be ex-
pected to be validated in practice, since it is possible for
food items from the same contaminated batch to depart
from the source in separate (and independent) trucks;
indeed, for large contamination incidents where the con-
taminated quantity will be larger than what fits in one
truck, this is necessarily the case. We therefore expect
the error caused by failing to consider shared pathways
to be of second order and that our solution is a good ap-
proximation of the maximum likelihood source estimator.
E. Illustration
21
3
4 5
0.5
0.5
0.3 0.7
1.0
BA
FIG. 2: (A) An example outbreak over a simple
network with two producer nodes, two retailer nodes,
and one intermediary node. Edges are annotated with
transition probabilities, and the shaded nodes represent
observations of contamination. (B) The set of all
cascades that could have possibly induced the outbreak
in A. Solid and dashed lines show paths of
contamination to nodes 4 and 5, respectively. Shaded
nodes are those through which contamination has
passed. pi11 is the higher-probability cascade in Π1 (the
set of all possible cascades starting from node 1), and
pi21 is the lower-probability cascade in Π1. pi2 and pi3 are
the only cascades in Π2 and Π3, respectively.
To demonstrate our method of calculating source prob-
abilities – as well as the benefit of considering all possible
paths – we now present an example outbreak over a small
food supply network.
We take G to be the network pictured in Fig. 2. Ad-
ditionally, we consider a two-observation outbreak, con-
sisting of one illness at node 4 and another illness at node
5.
We note that four cascades could possibly account for
this outbreak – they are pictured in Fig. 2B – and we use
this information to tractably calculate a source estimator
through equation (6).
Through equation (5), we evaluate the probabilities of
each of these cascades to be:
P (pi11 |s∗ = 1) = 0.5× 0.5× 0.7 = 0.175
P (pi21 |s∗ = 1) = 0.5× 0.3× 0.5× 0.7 = 0.0525
P (pi2|s∗ = 2) = 1.0× 0.3× 0.7 = 0.21
P (pi3|s∗ = 3) = 0.3× 0.7 = 0.21
Which gives us, through equation 6:
P (Θ|s∗ = 1) = 0.175 + 0.0525 = 0.2275
P (Θ|s∗ = 2) = 0.21
P (Θ|s∗ = 3) = 0.21
and thereby leads us to select node 1 as our most likely
source.
Expectedly, taking
PQ =
0 0 0.50 0 1
0 0 0

PR =
0.5 00 0
0.3 0.7

and evaluating the conditional outbreak probabilities via
the matrix formulation posed in equation (12) yields the
same values, and therefore estimator.
Note, however, that our answer hinges on our method
having accounted for all possible paths: considering only
the most probable cascades from each source would have
resulted in selection of node 2 or node 3 as the most
probable source despite the fact that node 1 delivers more
total volume to the sites of illness observation.
IV. EVALUATION
In Section III we derive the ML estimator for the source
of an outbreak of foodborne disease given an underlying
network structure. In this section we demonstrate the
performance benefits of the probabilistically exact source
estimator in application to different network topologies.
First we apply the method to stylized network models of
the food supply and simulated outbreaks of contamina-
tion. This allows us to evaluate the performance of our
ML source estimator and its robustness to differences in
network structure in an idealized setting. Applying the
method to stylized networks is equivalent to assuming
that the exact, complete network and outbreak data is
available for source location. In practice, food supply
networks are never exactly known, and illness data is
imperfect, especially during an unfolding outbreak when
data is emerging. In order to evaluate the robustness of
our conclusions in these non-ideal settings we also apply
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our method to illness data from a real outbreak, using
an estimated model of the relevant food supply network
structure. We introduce a simple and replicable way to
model the network based on available statistical data and
basic understanding of food supply logistics. Because the
estimated network is key to the implementation of the
method, this application represents an integrated eval-
uation of the ML source estimator combined with the
network modeling methodology.
A. Evaluation on stylized networks
1. Stylized network structures
We first evaluate our method on stylized models of food
supply networks. We choose for application one charac-
teristic food supply structure: a layered, directed net-
work consisting of four layers of supply, for which nodes
in each layer trade expressly with nodes in the subse-
quent layer; this is the structure exhibited by the net-
work in Fig. 1. Formally, this is a network of the form
G = V,E with four layers V = {V1, V2, V3, V4}, and di-
rected edges of the form (i, j) ∈ E for i ∈ Vn, j ∈ Vn+1,
n = 1, 2, 3. We consider two probabilistically different
network topologies based on this characteristic structure,
which we use to evaluate the source detection methods.
On one extreme is a structure for which a small percent-
age of edges carry the majority of the probability weight.
The dominant probabilities will capture a large fraction
of the product flowing through the network; therefore
we call this the dominant paths network. On the other
extreme is a structure for which each edge is probabilis-
tically equivalent to every other. Paths through this net-
work will also be probabilistically equivalent and no path
will capture more of the flow through the network than
any other; we therefore call this the non-dominant paths
network. We purposefully choose these two topologies
that, in addition to being relevant examples of food sup-
ply network structure, enable us to evaluate the robust-
ness of source detection methods to differences in path
probabilities.
The differing probabilities along the edges are deter-
mined by how nodes are connected. To create the dom-
inant paths network, we use a connection scheme for
which there is high variance in the degree D, or the
number of edges that any given node is connected to.
To achieve a wide distribution we sample the degree d
of each node according to a geometric distribution, i.e.
D ∼ geom(1/µD), where µD is the pre-defined aver-
age degree across all nodes. After assigning each node
an in- and out-degree, representing the number of in-
coming and outgoing edges, we randomly pair edges to
nodes in adjacent layers according to the Network Con-
figuration Model [32]. We then divide the probabilities
equally across all outgoing edges from each node, i.e.
pij = 1/d = 1/|j|. Edges coming from highly connected
nodes will therefore carry lower probability weight. This
can be interpreted as a dichotomy between supply net-
work actors with a large number of small trading partners
and actors with a small number of large trading partners.
For the non-dominant paths network, we use a determin-
istic connection scheme such that each node is connected
to exactly the same number of nodes as any other node
within the layer. The in- and out- degrees are thus the
same for all nodes in a layer, equal to µD , and the prob-
abilities are equal for all edges, i.e. pij = 1/µD.
For the simulations presented in this section we fix
25 nodes per layer, and we choose an average degree of
µD = 4. Many different network structures with these
parameters can be created according to the network gen-
eration process described both for dominant and non-
dominant paths connection schemes; we illustrate styl-
ized versions of these structures in Fig. 3.
2. Benchmarks
Throughout this section we will compare the per-
formance of our method to the Effective Distance
method for source identification proposed in [26, 27]
and to a benchmark indicating the accuracy of random
guessing, which we call the Network Baseline. As
discussed in Section II, the Effective Distance method
is the state-of-the-art approach for source detection on
weighted networks, and the method most relevant in
the context of the foodborne disease source detection.
The other methods reviewed in Section II are either
not implementable or impractical due to shortest path
assumptions. In the following we describe the Effective
Distance method in terms of the notation introduced in
Section III.
Effective Distance
The Effective Distance method for source identification
[26, 27] is based on the concept that the trajectory of a
particle diffusing through a network will primarily follow
(a) Non-Dominant Paths (b) Dominant Paths
FIG. 3: Toy example illustrating the structure of the
stylized networks analyzed in Section IV A. Both
networks have the same number of nodes, links, and
average degree, but the degree distributions vary:
(a) the Non-Dominant Paths Network is generated
according to a deterministic degree distribution, while
(b) the Dominant Paths Network is generated according
to a geometric degree distribution.
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the single shortest, highest probability path to any other
node. The true source s∗ of an outbreak should there-
fore be the node that exhibits the set of shortest, highest
probability paths to the outbreak node set o ∈ Θ.
Based on this logic, the authors introduce a metric for
the Effective Distance deff (i, j) between two connected
nodes i and j, defined such that the likelier the connec-
tion, the shorter the Effective Distance. This is given
as
deff (i, j) = 1− log pij , (15)
where pij is the probability of transiting from i to j as
defined in Section III. The effective length of a given path
γso between nodes s and o is then defined to be the sum
total of the Effective Distances of each edge (i, j) ∈ γso.
As discussed, the concept of [26, 27] is to focus on the
single shortest Effective Distance path over all possible
paths γso ∈ Γso from s to o. Therefore the Effective
Distance between s and o is defined as,
Deff (s, o) = min
γso∈Γso
∑
(i,j)∈γso
1− log pij
= min
γso∈Γso
[|γso| − logP (γso|s)] (16)
The inclusion of the logarithmic term allows path prob-
abilities to be determined by addition instead of multi-
plication, and the shortest Effective Distance path can
be identified with Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm us-
ing deff (i, j) for the length of each edge. The Effective
Distance of a path therefore results from a multifactorial
objective function that penalizes long path lengths while
rewarding high path probabilities.
The measure of Effective Distance is used in source
detection in the following way. For each feasible source
node s ∈ Ω the set piDeffs of shortest Effective Distance
paths to all unique observation nodes o ∈ Θ is identified.
Each s observation node o ∈ Θ is counted only once for
disease incidence, so pi
Deff
s represents an s-cascade with
no s repeated paths. An estimator sˆDeff then chooses
the source node that minimizes the mean µˆΘ(Deff (s, o))
and variance σˆ2Θ(Deff (s, o)) of the Effective Distances of
the paths in pi
Deff
S , according to the objective
sˆDeff = arg min
s∈Ω
√
µˆ2Θ(Deff (s, o)) + σˆ
2
Θ(Deff (s, o)).
(17)
This estimator is in effect identifying the source with
the set of shortest Effective Distances to the observation
node set Θ, offset by a variance term that discounts ex-
treme values.
It is important to note that when all paths γso ∈ Γso
from s to o are the same length, the Effective Distance
path identified by (16) will be the highest probability
path from s to o. In these cases, the Effective Distance
estimator sˆDeff is performing source identification by
considering the single set of highest probability paths
to the observation nodes o ∈ Θ, which is the s-cascade
pi
Deff
s = max
pis∈Πs
P (pis|s).
Network Baseline
We also compare results to the Network Baseline, a
benchmark that is equivalent to guessing at random be-
tween all feasible sources s ∈ Ω. Comparisons to this
benchmark demonstrate that the accuracy of source iden-
tification is not determined by the number of feasible
sources.
3. Simulation setting
For each network structure, we generate outbreaks by
using each node in layer V1 as the source. A Monte Carlo
simulation model determines the trajectories of contami-
nation through the supply chain, leading to observations
of illness at the set of node locations ok ∈ Θ. At a snap-
shot in the outbreak’s progression, the source detection
methods are applied and all feasible sources are rank-
ordered according to their probability values or Effective
Distances. This process is repeated at increasing inter-
vals in each outbreak’s progression, generating a series of
rankings as a function of the number of cases. We run 50
simulations per V1 node, for a total of 1000 outbreak sim-
ulations. To assess the traceback performance for each
network structure, the cumulative results of source de-
tection are quantified according to Simulation Accuracy,
which measures the percentage of times the true source
is accurately identified across all simulations.
4. Results
Fig. 4 demonstrates results for Simulation Accuracy
with our source detection method, the Effective Dis-
tance method, and the Network Baseline as a function
of the number of cases for the non-dominant paths net-
work ( 4a, left) and the dominant paths network ( 4b,
right). The Network Baseline or random guessing is in-
cluded to demonstrate that results are not due to a lack
of feasible sources; if there would be a lack of feasible
sources, the network baseline would increase in accuracy
very quickly, which is not the case.
For both networks our method performs well (see Figs.
4a and 4b) and follows expected properties, increasing in
accuracy with data on the number of illness reports. We
can make good inferences about the source location after
only a limited number of illnesses have been reported,
and very accurate inferences if we wait a bit longer. The
accuracy of source identification is faster and more accu-
rate for the dominant paths network ; this is as expected
since high probability edges will dominate the paths trav-
eled by contaminated product as well as the calculation
of the source identification likelihood. Despite the lack
of dominant path probabilities, Simulation Accuracy is
also high for the non-dominant paths network. What is
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happening is that when the probabilities of all paths are
equal, our method reduces to calculating the number of
possible s-cascades between a source and set of observa-
tions; this can be seen by replacing the pij in equation
(6) with a constant. This effectively turns our source es-
timator into a centrality-based method that chooses the
source that connects to the observations across the great-
est number of paths.
The comparison of Simulation Accuracy results for our
source estimator and the Effective Distance method make
apparent the benefit of considering all paths in estimat-
ing the source rather than selecting only the set of highest
probability paths. On the non-dominant paths network,
the Effective Distance method cannot compete; because
all paths appear the same, the method chooses one at
random, and as a result performs identically to the Net-
work Baseline. Still, this network is a stylized and ex-
treme case; most real-world food supply networks will
exhibit some degree of heterogeneity in path probabil-
ities. On the dominant paths network, which exhibits
significant heterogeneity in path probabilities, the Effec-
tive Distance method performs much better. This is as
expected: for each feasible source the method consid-
ers the highest probability s-cascade; when path proba-
bilities vary greatly, this will often be the actual set of
paths traveled by the contamination. However because
the contamination does not always travel along the high-
est probability s-cascade, by accounting for all possible
s-cascades, our method performs better by a substantial
margin of around 10%.
Since these two networks represent extremes in the way
probabilities might be distributed across a food supply
network, the results presented here suggest that source
identification in the context of foodborne disease is ro-
bustly and substantially more accurate when the total
probability across all possible paths between a feasible
(a) Accuracy:
Non-Dominant Paths
(b) Accuracy:
Dominant Paths
FIG. 4: Simulation Accuracy for the networks
introduced in Section IV A for our method for source
detection (blue,
⊙
), the Effective Distance method for
source detection (red, ∆), and the Network Baseline
(green, - -) as a function of the number of illnesses
reported.
source and the observation set is considered.
B. Application: 2011 EHEC O104:H4 Outbreak
In this section we evaluate our method in application
to the Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (EHEC)
O104:H4 outbreak in Germany in 2011, which affected
over 4,000 people with EHEC gastroenteritis or severe
hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS). Beyond its being a
widely-known, high-profile event, we choose this case for
application for the following reasons. First, it is a rele-
vant illustration of the type of large-scale distributed out-
break that motivated the design of our method. Second,
data informing an estimate of the underlying food supply
network structure is available for Germany, allowing us to
implement our source identification methodology. Third,
it was conclusively solved, meaning traced to a specific
origin location. This permits us to verify the accuracy of
the results of our method. Lastly, it allows comparison to
published results on the application of the existing best-
in- class method [27] to the same case. This enables us
to complement the evaluation of the comparative effec-
tiveness of the source detection methods on stylized data
presented in Section IV A with a practical evaluation in
application to real data.
1. EHEC 2011 outbreak background and investigation
timeline
Fig. 5 depicts the epidemic curve of the outbreak.
The first confirmed illness case began on May 1st,
marking the beginning of Week 1. The case count grew
dramatically starting on May 8th, at the beginning
of Week 2. The outbreak peaked on May 21 and 22,
between Week 3 and Week 4, and the majority of cases
had been reported by the end of Week 5. The last illness
associated with the outbreak was reported on July 4,
at the end of Week 9 going into Week 10, but the out-
break was declared over 3 weeks later, on July 26th. [1, 2]
Epidemiological interviews with patients in the first
outbreak clusters and subsequent analyses suggested that
(i) raw vegetables were the source of the infection, and
(ii) these vegetables were primarily consumed at restau-
rants [2, 33]. By Week 6 investigators had narrowed the
search down to contaminated sprouts and by the end of
that week, on June 10, confirmed the origin of the out-
break as a small organic farm in Bienenbuttel, in the dis-
trict Uelzen in Northern Germany. At this time a pub-
lic service announcement was issued advising the pub-
lic to avoid consuming raw sprouts, and the producer in
Bienenbuttel was temporary closed. Unfortunately, by
this point the contaminated product had made its way
through the supply chain and the majority of illnesses
had occurred, as is made clear in Fig. 5.
The outbreak was one of the most virulent and deadly
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in recent history, leading to 4,321 total outbreak cases,
including 3,469 cases of EHEC gastroenteritis, 852 cases
of HUS, and 54 reported deaths [1, 2]. The majority
of these illnesses (88%) and all of the deaths were in
Germany, and in particular northern Germany, but cases
were distributed across 16 countries including a few re-
ports in North America [1, 34].
2. Case data
The illness case data comes from the Robert Koch
Institute (RKI), Germany’s national public health au-
thority, by way of the ServStat tool [35]. We query this
tool for data on all cases of E.coli reported in Germany
during the dates May 1 to July 4, 2011, corresponding to
outbreak Weeks 1 through 9. This includes all cases of
any strain of E.coli contamination reported in Germany
during this time period, including cases unrelated to
the EHEC O104:H4 outbreak. Since the number of
cases known to be linked to this outbreak exceed the
routine baseline of E.coli contamination by a factor of 70
times during this time period in similar years [1], these
unrelated cases represent a minor source of noise in the
data.
Cases are reported in association with the German
“Landkreise” or administrative district where the patient
resides. There are a total of 402 districts in Germany.
We use only this data and do not consider cases reported
outside of Germany.
FIG. 5: The epidemiological curve of the EHEC
O104:H4 outbreak, depicting the number of cases by
date of illness onset. The first case of illness was
reported on May 4 and the last case on July 4, 2011.
The source of the outbreak, contaminated sprouts from
an organic farm in Bienenbu¨ttel, district Uelzen, was
confirmed on June 10, 2011. Image source: [1].
3. Network model
The source identification method described in Sec-
tion III assumes a model of the underlying food supply
network structure. Because exact, fine-grained data
on the supply network of food commodities are not
available, we develop a model of the network based on
publicly available data and a practical understanding
of food supply chain logistics. We focus this model on
the supply of vegetables in Germany because (i) raw
vegetables were suspected as the source of infection early
in the investigation and (ii) most of the reported cases
of illness were inside Germany.
As basis for the network model we use a probability
matrix PV for vegetables in Germany. The elements of
this matrix pij represent the probability of vegetables be-
ing transported from region i to j, such that
∑
j
pij = 1.
The vegetable data originates from a meta-model of the
food supply in Germany differentiating between the 402
German administrative districts and 50 import countries
[36]. To estimate the data the meta-model uses gravity
models calibrated with transport matrix data from the
German Infrastructure Master Plan [37]. The gravity
models are based on available statistics from agricultural
production, consumption, and sectorial interrelations.
For more details on the modeling approach and data
sources see [36]. This work represents, to the best of our
knowledge, the only model of the German food supply
that is also calibrated and is therefore the best available
data on which to base our network model.
Many of the reported cases of illness occurred in
clusters linked to restaurants [2]. Restaurants primarily
get their deliveries from wholesalers. We assume that the
path of vegetables via wholesalers has three edges: one
from the farmer or producer to the wholesaler specialized
on vegetables, one from the specialized wholesaler to
the wholesaler doing the distribution, and one from the
distribution wholesaler to the restaurants. While this
is an approximation, interviews with practitioners have
established that the three-edge path is the dominant
logistic structure for vegetables traveling to restaurants
through wholesaling [38].
We therefore have a network following the characteris-
tic structure defined in Section IV A – a directed network
with four layers V = {V1, V2, V3, V4} and directed edges
(i, j) ∈ E with i ∈ Vn, j ∈ Vn+1, n = 1, 2, 3. The first
layer has V1 = 452 nodes representing vegetable produc-
tion in the German districts and import countries; all
other layers have 402 nodes representing only the Ger-
man districts. The network thus allows for domestic or
international production. The nodes on the first three
levels are transient nodes VQ = {V1, V2, V3}; the nodes
on the last level are the absorbing nodes VR = V4 . The
transition matrix P using the German vegetable supply
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probability matrix PV as input is then:
P =

0 PV 0 0
0 0 PV 0
0 0 0 PR = PV
0 0 0 IR
 .
To implement the source estimator on this network,
we assume the outbreak began with a producer, i.e. the
source is a node s ∈ V1. Because it was not known what
vegetable was causing the infection, we do not assume
any prior information regarding the source location and
we assume a uniform prior distribution over all feasible
sources. We also implement an adjustment to account for
the population density of each German district, normal-
izing the probability of a region reporting an illness by
the population density of that region. This ensures the
probability of a region reporting an illness is weighted
equally.
4. Results and discussion
To evaluate source identification “in real time,” we run
the source detection methods on data available at the end
of each week of the outbreak. Results are reported for our
method in combination with the vegetable network model
described above and for the Effective Distance method in
combination with a network modeling approach reported
in [27], a gravity model network of spatial food trans-
portation based on population statistics. Despite using
different network models, our results are comparable be-
cause the feasible sources in both network models are the
same set of administrative districts in Germany (without
including international production). We also note that
we evaluated the Effective Distance method in combi-
nation with our network, but accuracy was much lower
and so here we compare to the results published in [27]
(results were only provided for outbreak Weeks 3 – 9).
We report on accuracy according to two metrics: the
rank of the true source, the position of the ordered rank-
ing, and the top-3 distance to the true source, the aver-
age distance to the true source in Bienenbuu¨ttel from the
center of the top three ranked locations.
Table II reports the source identification performance
metrics for our method and the Effective Distance
method by each week of the outbreak. Our approach is
accurate, timely, and consistent, identifying the source
district Uelzen in rank 3 by Week 2 of the outbreak,
and in the top 2 ranked locations for the remainder
of the outbreak. Importantly, though not reported
in the table, the district in rank 1 during Weeks 2-4,
Lu¨chow-Dannenberg, is adjacent to Uelzen and its
center is as close in distance (km) to the origin farm in
Bienebu¨ttel as the center of Uelzen. Furthermore, the
consistency of the result in the ordered ranking and the
top-3 distance to the true source indicates convergence of
the method, signifying a reliable signal for investigators.
In comparison, the Effective Distance method is less
consistent, identifying the source location within the top
10 ranks in some weeks but not in others, including the
critical period around the peak of the outbreak.
Fig. 6 visualizes the probability distribution result-
ing from applying the source identification method to
the case data available at the end of Weeks 2-6, with
darker shading representing higher probabilities. The
true source in Bienebu¨ttel, district Uelzen, is indicated
with the black dot and line. As can be seen in the images,
the highest probability locations (also the top ranked lo-
cations) frame the outbreak into a small regional area
around the true source.
During an outbreak, accurate and timely identification
of the source is essential to stem impact on the public.
In the context of the EHEC outbreak, this would have
meant identifying the source before Week 4, when the
outbreak peaked. By developing a source identification
approach that accounts for the specific features of
foodborne disease transmission and combining it with a
network model based on food supply data, we are able
to demonstrate significant and timely improvements
to source identification on a real case. Our method
consistently identifies the source region based on the
data available as early as Week 2 of the outbreak, well
before the peak. In comparison, the Effective Distance
method is inconsistent in identifying the source region,
particularly between Weeks 3 and 4, and the standard
investigation process (e.g. triangulation) used in the
case did not identify the source until Week 6.
While our source identification is only as granular as
the geographic districts in the network, this information
could have been used during the critical early period of
the investigation, supplementing conventional methods
to help investigators narrow down the list of potential
source locations, e.g. to farms located within the black
shaded regions in Fig. 6. This also might have prevented
Outbreak
Week
Rank of True Source
Location
Top-3 Distance from
True Source (in km)
This Work Effective
Distance
[27]
This Work Effective
Distance
[27]
1 38 – 180.0 –
2 3 – 148.8 –
3 2 1 83.7 71.3
4 2 >10 40.8 98.3
5 1 3 28.7 43.7
6 1 1 28.7 30.3
7 1 1 28.7 30.3
8 1 5 28.7 135.0
9 1 2 28.7 65.0
TABLE II: Source identification performance metrics for
our method and the Effective Distance method applied
to data from the 2011 EHEC O104:H4 outbreak.
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FIG. 6: Geographical representation of the probability of each of the 402 German administrative districts being the
source based on source identification results using our model. Darker shading represents higher probability. The
true source in Bienenbu¨ttel, district Uelzen, is indicated.
investigators from pursuing false leads. This occurred in
early stages of the 2011 EHEC outbreak investigation,
when investigators wrongly implicated cucumbers pro-
duced by a Spanish produce cooperative, wiping out over
a month’s worth of production and doing lasting damage
to the reputation of the Spanish cucumber industry as a
whole [43].
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops a methodology to identify the
source of large-scale outbreaks of foodborne disease. We
formulate a probabilistic model of the foodborne disease
contamination transmission process as an absorbing
random walk on a network and derive an estimator for
the source location. This is the maximum likelihood
source estimator for a diffusion process on a weighted,
directed network with absorbing nodes. By formulating
the transmission process as a random walk, we are able
to develop a novel, computationally tractable solution
to the source detection problem that accounts for all
possible paths of travel through the network.
Existing source location methods for diffusion pro-
cesses assume that the contamination travels along
either the shortest or highest probability paths, which
is an unrealistic approximation in the context of many
real-world networks, as exemplified by the foodborne
disease problem. Thus, the primary contribution of this
work is the development of a probabilistically exact
source location estimator for large-scale outbreaks that
is not limited to tree-like approximations. Application to
stylized networks and a real outbreak case demonstrate
the benefits of the probabilistically exact estimator
in comparison with the state-of-the art approach to
source detection of diffusion-type processes on weighted
networks. Given the exact food supply network data,
our approach shows significant improvements in accu-
racy and robustness, especially for particular network
structures without a unique set of dominant paths.
Furthermore, application to real data from the EHEC
outbreak demonstrates that our approach is also more
reliable, consistently identifying the source location
region over the time course of the outbreak. These
results suggest our method is closer to adaptation for
use by investigators, and could be of help in narrowing
down the set of possible sources more quickly.
While motivated by the case of foodborne disease,
a natural extension of this work is the application
to identifying the source of network-based diffusion
processes more generally, such as infectious disease
spread through global metapopulation-type transport
networks or bacterial contaminations spread through
water distribution networks. Because the methods de-
veloped here consider all possible diffusion trajectories,
their application to other real-world problem contexts
should demonstrate similar benefits as those shown for
foodborne disease, i.e. greater timeliness, accuracy, and
reliability in outbreak source localization, especially for
non-tree-like network topologies.
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